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LIABILITY OF THE GROUND CONTROL
OPERATOR FOR NEGLIGENCE
By SAMUEL EWER EASTMAN
B.S.E. Princeton University, 1944; Research Assistant in
Aeronautical Engineering, Princeton University, 1944; Flight
Engineer, U.S. Navy, 1944-46; LL.B. Harvard Law School,
1949; Research Assistant to John C. Cooper, Institute For
Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey; Member, Massa-
chusetts Bar.
T HE purpose of this article is to present a general discussion of the
tort liability of the ground control operator for negligence in
rendering service to the aircraft operator which results in harm to that
operator and his passengers. By "ground control operator" is meant
persons situate on the ground employed to provide information to,
direct, and operate instruments assisting in the direction of aircraft,
both while on the ground and in the air.' Intended to be included
in this definition are weather dispatchers, radio operators, GCA and
ILS operators and maintenance personnel, as well as traffic directors,
control tower personnel, and the like. As indicated by the two dis-
asters at the Washington National Airport last year, 2 and the recent
crash of the Northwest Airlines transport in Minnesota,3 the matter is
not only of theoretical interest but has immediate practical implica-
tions as well.
At the outset it should be pointed out that no attempt is made to
distinguish suits brought by the aircraft operator and suits brought
by his passengers. The approach taken has been first to consider rele-
vant background material, then to take up liability of the ground
control operator as a private individual, and finally, liability of
government where the ground control operator is an agent of govern-
ment. This has been done in an effort to focus attention on what is
1 It is, of course, assumed that such persons do not have a common principal
with the aircraft operator.
2 With respect to the collision between the P-38 and the Eastern Air Lines
DC-4, Capt. Bridoux, pilot of the fighter aircraft stated: " . . . that his radio
message [desire to land because of engine trouble] had not been acknowledged by
the tower operator," and that "he had never been specifically instructed by the
tower to 'turn left.' " The ground control officer had been specifically instructed
to watch the P-38. New York Times, November 11, 1949 [1:2]. In reporting the
Capital Air Lines crash it was noted: "sometime before the crash .. . contact
with the field through radio and radar was lost . . . According to the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration, the plane was making an instrument landing with a
ceiling of about 400'." New York Times, December 13, 1949 [1:6]. Both of these
reports indicate the possibility of a finding of negligence on the part of the ground
control operator. No such suggestion is intended to be made here however. See
also: Sufficient Altitude Not Maintained, C.A.A. Journal, Vol. 10, No. 10, October
15, 1949 at page 117 (ILS out of calibration).
3 "Civil Aeronautics radio control tower operators reported that the ship
was seeking to make the Minneapolis landing on instruments through the swirling
snow." New York Times, March 8, 1950 [1:7].
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believed are the two basic considerations: (a) whether there exists
in the law of tort a basis for liability of the ground control operator,
and, since most operators are agents of government, (b) whether there
exists in favor of government an immunity from conduct of its agents
for which it would otherwise be liable. It should be noted, in addition,
that the problem of liability of the ground control operator where an
agent of government divorced from the liability of government itself
is also laid to one side.4
I - GENERAL AIRPORT CASES
Numerous decisions involving liability of the airport owner or
operator for injury to third persons and property indicate that one
engaging in such activity is liable as is any other landowner or posses-
sor of land for negligence to invitees.5 Other cases concern themselves
with negligence generally6 as in the operation of instrumentalities, 7 or
are based upon some contractual relationship.8  Many of the actions
are against municipalities and the greater part of the opinion deals
with whether the particular operation was in the exercise of a "proprie-
tary" or "governmental" function. 9 The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has refused to apply its "playground rule" deriviative of the
attractive nuisance doctrine where the locus in quo was a road-like
4 The difficult immunity question arises when it is sought to enjoin an agent
of government. See: Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682 (1948).
5 E.g., Strong v. McDuffie, Receiver for Richfield Oil Co., Chronicle Publish-
ing Co., et al., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 335; 93 P. (2d) 649; 1939 U.S.Av.R. 222; 1 Avi.
851 1939); Birckhead v. Sammon et al., 171 Md. 178; 189 A. 265; 1937 U.S.Av.R.
11; 1 Avi. 651 (1936); Mollencop v. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137; 8 P. (2d) 783;
1932 U.S.Av.R. 22; 1 Avi. 330 (1932); Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S. W.
(2d) 394; 1937 U.S.Av.R. 153; 1 Avi. 645 (1936).
6 E.g., City of Mobile v. Lartigue, et al., 23 Ala. App. 479; 127 So. 257; 1930
U.S.Av.R. 50; 1 Avi. 206 (1930); Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661;
189 S.E. 63; 1937 U.S.Av.R. 47; 1 Avi. 657 (1936); Rhodes v. City of Asheville et
al., .. N.C. .. , 2 Avi. 907 (1949); Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483;
126 S.W. (2d) 339; 1939 U.S.Av.R. 42; 1 Avi. 820 (1939).
7 E.g., Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715; 295 P. 59; 1931 U.S.
Av.R. 61; 1 Avi. 253 (1930); Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, et al., 20 Tenn.
App. 404; 99 S.W. (2d) 557; 1937 U.S.Av.R. 145; 1 Avi. 600 (1935).
8 E.g., Abbott v. City of Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494; 298 N.W. 649; 1941 U.S.
Av.R. 39; 1 Avi. 968 (1941); City of Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okla. 338; 62 P. (2d)
1219; 1937 U.S.Av.R. 180; 1 Avi. 661 (1936). But cf. Baruch v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 172 F. (2d) 445; 1949 U.S.Av.R. 104; 2 Avi. 819 (1949). See generally:
Rhyne, Airports and the Courts (Washington 1944) Chapter VI, pp. 73-81.
9 Cases favoring or holding municipality liable: City of Mobile v. Lartigue
et al., supra note 6; Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, 29 Cal. A-pp. (2d) 286; 84 P.
(2d) 1966; 1939 U.S.Av.R. 28; 1 Avi. 794 (1938); Coleman v. City of Oakland,
supra note 7; Peavey v. City of Miami, 146 Fla. 629; 1 So. (2d) 614; 1941 U.S.
Av.R. 28; 1 Avi. 955 (1941); Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, supra note 6; Rhodes
v. City of Asheville et al., supra note 6; City of Blackwell v. Lee, supra note 8;
Mollencop v. City of Salem, supra note 5; Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra
note 5. Contra: Abbott v. City of Des Moines, supra note 8; Stocker v. City of
Nashville, supra note 6; Opinion of Attorney General, 1945 U.S.Av.R. 134;
Opinion of Attorney General, 1945 U.S.Av.R. 201; Cf. Swoger v. Glynn County
et al., 179 Ga. 768; 177 S.E. 723; 1935 U.S.Av.R. 9; 1 Avi. 551 (1945); City of
Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100; 263 P. 12; 1928 U.S.Av.R. 8; 1 Avi. 107 (1928);
Dysart v. City of St. Louis, et al., 321 Mo. 514; 11 S.W. (2d) 1045; 1929 U.S.Av.
R. 15; 1 Avi. 129 (1928).
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extension of a runway.' 0 An interesting case involving the problem of
causation was decided in 1936 when the Maryland Court of Appeals"
reversed a lower court finding of no negligence as a matter of law on
the part of the airport operator. A child was struck by an independ-
ently owned and operated aircraft engaged in landing. Answering
the allegation of independent and intervening cause, the court stated:
"... we are unable to hold as a matter of law that there was no con-
curring and contributing want of due care on [the part of the air-
port operator] when, in the absence of what might be regarded as
reasonably requisite safeguards, it permitted the unrestricted use of
the field by other aircraft during the progress of the air circus by
which the crowd was then being held and diverted .. " 12
The court was of the opinion that defendant having one group of
invitees already on hand, it could have been a breach of duty to that
group to allow the presence of a different invitee group.
There is judicial authority to support the recognition of an estab-
lished duty on the part of the airport operator to keep the runways
free from obstructions or other dangers, so far as is reasonably possible,
or to place markers around areas where dangers exist in order that
pilots may be warned. 13 This duty has been held to apply to the negli-
gent acts of a third person which the airport operator could have been
reasonably expected to foresee. 14. It is apparently also the law of Great
Britain. 15 However, the pilot is obligated to exercise due care at least
to the extent of circling or "dragging" the field in daylight' 6 before
attempting a landing, 17 and by keeping himself informed as to the
condition of the field upon which he contemplates landing when such
notice is made public in a place where pilots would naturally see it.is
The burden of showing actual or constructive notice of the danger in
the defendant is of course on the plaintiff.' )
10 Prokop et ux. v. Becker et al., 345 Pa. 607; 29 A. (2d) 23; 1942 U.S.Av.R.
84; 1 Avi. 1069 (1942).
11 Birckhead v. Sammon et al., supra note 5.
12 1937 U.S.Av.R. 26; 1 Avi. 657.
13 E.g., Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F. (2d) 114; 1941 U.S.Av.R. 76; 1 Avi.
974 (1940); Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, supra note 9; Peavey v. City of
Miami, supra note 9; Read v. New York City Airport, Inc., 145 N.Y. Misc. 294;
259 N.Y.S. 245; 1933 U.S.Av.R. 31; 1 Avi. 370 (1932); Stevenson et al. v. Reimer,
35 N.W. (2d) 764; 2 Avi. 835 (1949).
14 Pignet v. City of Santa *Monica, supra note 9. This holding was reversed
in part on appeal. The case was sent back to the jury with instructions that the
third person's negligence could not be imputed either to the city or its operator.
Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, supra note 9. Accord: Birckhead v. Sammon et al.,
supra notes 5 and 12.
.15 "The effect of this judgment is that the proprietors of a public aerodrome
... are under an obligation; (a) to see that the aerodrome is safe for use by such
aircraft as are entitled to use it, and (b) to give proper warning of any danger
of which they knew or ought to have known." Imperial Airways, Ltd., v. National
Flying Services, Ltd., reported in 1933 U.S.Av.R. 50 (1932).
16 Read v. New York City Airport, Inc., supra note 13.
17 Peavey v. City of Miami, supra note 9; Davies v. Oshkosh Airport, Inc.,
214 Wise. 236; 252 N.W. 602; 1934 U.S.Av.R. 122; 1 Avi. 503 (1934).
18 Peavey v. City of Miami, supra note 9.
19 Employers Fire Insurance Co., v. City of St. Louis, (St. Louis, Mo.,
Magistrate's Ct. July 1, 1949) reported in 1949 U.S.Av.R. 18.
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II - GROUND CONTROL CASES
Before proceeding to a discussion as to the possible existence of a
duty between the ground control operator, and the aircraft operator
and his passengers, especially in light of the more modern instrument
landing system (ILS) and ground control approach (GCA),20 it is
necessary to consider in detail three decided cases.
In April of 1941- the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided
the Finera case, 21 an action for personal injuries brought as a result of
a ground collision between two aircraft at the Detroit City Airport.
Plaintiff had completed his landing and was proceeding to taxi when
he was struck by defendant, then about to take-off. Plaintiff's attempt
to set aside a directed verdict in favor of defendant failed primarily
because of his own contributory negligence, the court stating that
plaintiff had ". . . deliberately placed himself in a perilous position by
failing to observe what he admits there was nothing to prevent his see-
ing, if he had looked ... .,22 The case is -of importance here because
plaintiff insisted he had a right to "rely on light and radio signals from
the airport signal tower, operated by the City of Detroit . . ." and that
"no signal; neither red, white, nor green lights were flashed; nor did
any message by radio come to him from the tower ... .,2 The court
stated that no duty existed because of a rule of the Board of Aero-
nautics of Michigan that "upon landing upon an airport, a pilot shall
assure himself that there is no danger of collision ... ',24 and because
of a notice posted on the airport bulletin board by the City to the
effect that "the green or white light shall in no instance relieve the
pilot from exercising due care and diligence in observing and avoiding
other planes in the air or on the ground." 25 The City of Detroit had
undertaken no more than to carry out the instructions of the airport
manager to tower men, that whenever they were unoccupied with
other duties they should, if possible, regulate ground traffic as a matter
of accommodation. The exercise of such a function was merely a
custom, it established no duty. Those cases like Erie Railroad Com-
pany v. Stewart,2 6 holding that one who has adopted a customary
method of warning in excess of reasonable requirements and when
under no duty to do so may not abandon the practice without reason-
able care to warn of the discontinuance, were held "not controlling
in the face of the facts of the instant case. ' 27
20 See discussion infra note 33.
21 Finera v. Thomas et al., d.b.a. Thomas Brothers Air Service et al., 119 F.
(2d) 28 (C.C.A. 6th 1941); 1941 U.S.Av.R. 1; 1 Avi. 949.
22 1941 U.S.Av.R. 7; 1 Avi. 951.
23 Id.
24 Rule 19 quoted in the opinion. 1941 U.S.Av.R. 6; 1 Avi. 951.
25 Id.
26 40 F. (2d) 855 (C.C.A. 6th 1930). Infra note 36.
27 1941 U.S.Av.R. 7; 1 Avi. 951.
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Johnson v. Western Air Express Corporation,28 was the action
brought by Osa Johnson for personal injuries and for the alleged negli-
gent death of her husband, Martin Johnson, occasioned by the crash
of a Boeing transport on Los Pinetos peak in the San Gabriel moun-
tains. The aircraft had been attempting an instrument approach to
the Burbank Airport. In addition to the carrier, plaintiff sought to
hold defendant United Airports Company for "failure to supply a
radio localizer beam to the Western Air Express plane for instrument
approach to the airport at such times as the same was requested. '29 The
California Court of Appeals refused to upset a jury verdict in favor of
the defendants because the testimony "furnished grounds upon which
the jury could predicate a finding that the disaster occurred by reasons
of the unusual forcei of nature, and was one which could not have
been reasonably anticipated, guarded against or resisted; that the crash
was occasioned by the violence of the elements alone, and that the
agency of men had nothing to do therewith. ' 30 With respect to the
allegation against United Airports, .the court stated there was not a
scintilla of evidence that a localizer beam was ever requested and re-
fused, and further, there was nothing in the pleadings to indicate that
the giving or failure to give such a beam in any way caused the aircraft
to depart from its "position of safety." Similar allegations against the
ground radio operator (weather) were disposed of in an identical
manner.
The very recent case of Marino v. United States,3 1 goes far in con-
tradicting the dicta of the Finera case that no duty exists on the part
of the ground -control operator. The action was one for personal
injuries sustained by a workman when an army aircraft, taxiing out to
the line for take-off, struck the tractor with which he was working.
Plaintiff had been instructed to be on the lookout for aircraft while
working on the runway and to watch the control tower for signals. In
this particular instance no signal was made. Upon the testimony of
two Army witnesses who stated that it was the duty of the tower to
keep things clear on the ground as well as in the air and that this duty
ran to the plaintiff, the court allowed recovery. It stated:
"It has not been overlooked that the control tower was a busy
place, and that other planes than the P-51 had to be advised in mak-
ing landings, but the repairs to the surface of the runway were
important enough to the Air Service to call for the exercise of rea-
sonable care to guard against such an accident as took place, and it
is my considered view that such reasonable care was not exer-
cised." 32
This holding is a particularly strong one in view of the fact that plain-
tiff's getting out of the way on previous occasions without signals from
28 45 Cal. App. (2d) 614; 114 P. (2d) 688; 1941 U.S.Av.R. 95; 1 Avi. 976
(1941).
29 141 U.S.Av.R. 110, 1 Avi. 983.
3 0 Ibid. 107; 1 Avi. 982.
3' 84 F. Supp. 721 (W.D.N.Y. 1949); 1949 U.S.Av.R. 308; 2 Avi. 957
32 1949 U.S.Av.R. 314; 2 Avi. 961.
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the tower was not held to have constituted sufficient notice as to make
him guilty of contributory negligence when he relied in this instance.
The Modern Instrument Facilities
Further discussion requires some knowledge of modern instrument
landing facilities. D. W. Rentzel, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics,
has outlined the ILS and GCA systems in his recent testimony before
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the Senate.3 3
The ILS system operates on radio principles and consists of two ground
transmitters and a cross-pointer indicator located in the cockpit of the
aircraft. One transmitier, the localizer, guides the aircraft laterally to
keep it on the centerline of the runway, while the other, emitting the
glide path beam, serves to guide the aircraft's rate of descent and ver-
tical angle of approach. The horizontal needle of the cross-pointer is
actuated by the glide path transmitter and the vertical needle by the
localizer transmitter. When the two needles are at right angles the
pilot knows he is on the correct approach path. Should the aircraft
deviate, appropriate corrections are made by use of the aircraft control
system to place the needles in the proper position - and the aircraft
back on the correct approach path.
The GCA system as a component of the "precision beam radar"
system, discussed by Mr. Rentzel, provides for no cockpit instrument.
The aircraft is picked up by ground radar and the ground control
operator "talks" the pilot in for his landing. This is accomplished by
the pilot's obeying his ground-sent instructions received over ordinary
voice radio, the ground operator matching the "blip" (representing
the aircraft) against etched lines on a ground glass screen which fixed
lines indicate the correct flight approach path.
III - LIABILITY OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
As was argued by the plaintiff in the Finera case, 34 there is a rule
of tort liability that whenever one voluntarily comes to the aid of an-
other and the latter relies upon such undertaking, there is imposed
upon the former a duty of care at least to the extent of not placing
the person acting in reliance in a more disadvantageous position than
he was in prior to the voluntary undertaking. The Restatement of
the Law of Torts states the proposition in the following manner:
"(1) One who gratuitously renders services to another .... is
subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the other by his fail-
ure, while so doing, to exercise with reasonable care such compe-
tence and skill as he possesses or leads the other reasonably to
believe that he possesses.
"(2) One who gratuitously renders services to another .... is
not subject to liability for discontinuing the services if he does not
33 Statement of Hon. D. W. Rentzel, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics,
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce United
States Senate, 81st Congress (1st Session), Pursuant to S. Res. 51 (Washington:
Government Printing Office 1949) Part 1 page 161.
* I Supra note 21.
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thereby leave the other in a worse position than he was in when the
services were begun." 35
The leading case is Erie Railroad Company v. Stewart, 6 holding
that the failure of a railroad company to continue maintaining a
watchman at one of its crossings (when not required by law) consti-
tuted a breach of duty to a passenger riding in a truck struck by one
of the company's trains. The majority opinion required that the per-
son relying have knowledge of the custom in order that the reliance
be one into which he had been led by the company.8 7 The minority
judge held such a custom was widespread and one which the railroad
company was bound to assume the general public would rely on.3
Perhaps the most important concept in this rule of liability is
reliance. Consider the aircraft operator near or over an airport upon
which contact landing is impossible. Could the failure of ground per-
sonnel to exercise due care in directing a landing place the operator
in a worse position than the one he was in prior to starting his descent
through the overcast? Reliance imports choice. The operator can
either take his changes on finding a hole in the weather, seek an alterna-
tive landing field and the facilities that may there be available, or fly
in on instruments dependent almost wholly upon guidance from the
ground.
No operator would attempt a flight knowing his point of destina-
tion to be closed unless he knew about and relied on some means of
instrument landing. Then, too, complete payload utilization demands
the minimum carriage of extra fuel-thirty gallons is roughly equiva-
lent to one paying passenger. To obtain maximum operating effici-
ency the operator necessarily relies upon weather and other data as
well as available instrument landing facilities. Modern air transport
must more and more be an effective integration of all efforts if it is
to continue to improve the overall efficiency, safety record and cer-
tainty of schedule. Obviously there is no bright line of difference
which determines where and in what instances relience is placed on
ground facilities, and where that reliance begins and where it ends.
But does this mean that the radio operator exonerated from liabil-
ity in the Johnson case for failure to transmit what turned out to be
an important weather report 9 should now be held for the loss of a
modern airliner and its fifty or more passengers? At least one court
would probably respond in the negative. In deciding Moch v. Rensse-
laer Walter Company,40 Judge Cardozo sought to draw a distinction
between an inaction which was merely the denial of a benefit and an
action which positively or actively worked an injury. In that case
35 Restatement, Torts §323 (1934).
36 Supra note 26.
37 40 F. (2d) 855, 857.
38 Ibid. at 858.
39 41 U.S.Av.R. 95, 108.
40 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
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defendant water works company had contracted with a city to furnish
hydrant water. Plaintiff sought to hold the water company in tort4'
for the loss of his warehouse by fire, occasioned it was alleged, by
defendant's negligent failure to maintain sufficient water pressure at
the hydrant. The court refused to enlarge the zone of duty imposed
upon the water works,42 stating as follows its opinion as to what might
result from a contrary holding:
The dealer in coal who is to supply fuel for a shop must then an-
swer to the customers if fuel is lacking. The manufacturer of
goods, who enters upon the performance of his contract, must an-
swer, in that view, not only to the buyer, but to those who to his
knowledge are looking to the buyer for their own sources of supply.
Everyone making a promise having the quality of a contract will be
under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under
another duty, apart from the contract, to an indefinite number of
potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. 43
In addition to the "must stop somewhere" attitude, commentators
have indicated that the courts' reasoning is perhaps inconsistent with
other decisions by Mr. Justice Cardozo,4 4 and that it is based on the
illusory distinction of New York tort law between non-performance
and mis-performance. 45 It has also been suggested that paramount in
the court's mind was the danger. of increased cost of water service
should liability be imposed-the balancing of capacity to bear the
loss4 "-and that the rule of the case might have been earmarked a
"special waterworks situation.' 47
In the Moch case the policy question was whether the individual
should bear the loss, or whether the water works should assume liabil-
ity, resulting in a consequent increase in water rates for all users. While
there may be analogy between the parties in the two situations-ground
control operator for water works, aircraft operator for city, and passen-
ger for plaintiff-the policy question seems considerably different. In
the first place alternative forms of transportation to air travel do exist
and however desirable it may be to keep air fares at a minimum, these
reasons are not as compelling as where the service is on a more monopo-
listic basis. In addition, the grade of service provided by the ground
control operator cannot be divided by a determination of liability or
no-liability in a particular situation as can the service offered by a
water works. There is no regular and normal use of instrument land-
41 In addition to common-law tort, plaintiff sought to hold defendant for
breach of statutory duty and for breach of contract. 247 N.Y. 160, 163.
42 Contra:Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 128 N.C. 375, 38 S.E. 912
(1901); Cases cited, Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (St. Paul 1941)
p. 208, note 18; Note, 12 Corn. Law Quart. 207, 210 (1926).
43 247 N.Y. 160, 168.
44 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372,
393 (1939).
45 Prosser, op. cit., supra note 41 pp. 208, 698.
46 Prosser, ibid. pp. 27, 185.
47 Seavey, supra note 42 at 391.
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ing facilities as there is of water. To suggest therefore that the aircraft
operator might pay one charge for a "no liability for negligence"
ground control service and another charge for a "liability for negli-
gence" service contradicts public policy.
Liability of the ground control operator premised upon his gratu-
itous undertaking while the most general, including as it may in any
particular situation where the other elements necessary for a tort are
present, almost every ground service rendered the aircraft: operator, is
not the only basis upon which liability can be supported. Liability
for negligence on the part of the ground control operator, where the
physical directing of the aircraft is taken away from the aircraft opera-
tor might be premised on the transfer of "control." 48 Consider the
transport aircraft making a GCA landing and assume that due to the
negligence of the ground control operator instruments are out of cali-
bration or that an incorrect instruction is given, with the result that
the pilot, following instructions and through no negligence on his part,
flies into the side of a nearby hill. Who was in "control" of the landing
operation? The pilot so long as he proceeds with this type of instru-
ment operation merely actuates the controls, blindly, in accordance
with instructions from the ground. With the ground control operator
assuming charge as well as intimate physical direction of the aircraft
itself, the usual rule of liability for negligence should apply,4 9 and
other necessary elements present he would be liable not only to the
aircraft operator and his passengers for harm attributable to that negli-
gence, but for damage to the persons and property of third persons
on the ground in addition.
Continuing this reasoning a step further introduces a lent-servant
problem. With the pilot acting under the direction of the GCA opera-
tor, it is possible to argue that for the landing operation he ceases to
be a servant of the aircraft operator and for purposes of tort liability,
is transferred to the service of his special master, the ground control
operator.6 0 Should this be the case the person most affected would be
48 In Wanderer v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Beige d'Exploitation de la Navigation
Aerienne (SABENA), and Pan American Airways, Inc., 1949 U.S.Av.R. 25(S.C.N.Y., February 10, 1949), a passenger having a passage ticket issued bydefendant SABENA sought to hold defendant Pan American Airways for in-juries sustained as a result of the crash of an aircraft owned by SABENA. The
complaint alleged "that the defendant Pan American controlled the operations
of the defendant Sabena at Gander Airfield; that when the airplane crashed it
was being controlled by both defendants, and the defendant Pan American was
further charged with fault in failing to instruct the pilot to proceed to another
airfield where weather conditions were more favorable than the conditions pre-
vailing in Gander at the time of the accident."
49 Restatement, Torts, Sec. 281 (1934).
0 "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is an inference that the
actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered an-
other, he is performing the business entrusted to him by the general employer."
Restatement, Agency §227 Comment (b) (1933). Where the servant in question
operates machinery it has been said that it is the work or service that has been
transferred. Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909). See also:
Robins Dry Dock and Repair Company v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 261
N.Y. 455 (1933).
LIABILITY OF GROUND CONTROL OPERATOR
the pilot, whose recovery might be denied by the fellow servant rule.5 2
It is extremely doubtful however whether a court would go as far as
to recognize the establishment of an agency pro hac vice in any real
sense.
5 2
In the special situation where the ground control operator is an
agent of the airport operator, liability for negligence resulting in harm
to the aircraft operator and his passengers might be based upon the
fact that the latter are business invitees . 3 This is the normal situation
with respect to property on the ground, and at least in the airspace
immediately above the airport as well.54
IV - LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT
The preceeding discussion has been devoted to a study of rules of
tort liability which might apply, in a given situation, to the activities
of the ground control operator. Most ground control operators are
however, agents of a municipal, state, or the federal government, and
any discussion which does not consider even if briefly the immunities
recognized by tort law in behalf of such governments would be mani-
festly incomplete.
As indicated earlier, tort liability of a municipality depends in most
jurisdictions upon whether the particular act or omission complained
of was committed in the exercise of a "proprietary" or "governmental"
function."' Since the classification of particular functions as one or the
other is not only difficult but variant from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,56
only a few comments are worthwhile here. In Rhodes v. City of Ashe-
ville,5 7 the Supreme Court of North Carolina had before it an action
against a municipal airport operator for wrongful death. After re-
viewing the authorities the court stated:
"We have found no decision.., in which any Court of last resort
in this country, has held that the construction, operation and main-
tenance of an airport by a municipality is a governmental function
However, "if the temporary employer exercises such control over the conduct
of the employee as would make the employee his servant were it not for his
general employment, the employee as to such act becomes a servant of the tem-
porary emnloyer." Restatement, Agency §227 Comment (d) (1933). Denton v.
Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. et al., 248 U.S. 305 (1932); McFarland
v. Dixie Machinery & Equipment Company, 348 Mo. 341; 153 S.W. 2d 67 (1941).
51 Restatement, Agency §476 Comment (b) (1933).
52 If the pilot is truly the servant of the ground control operator, the latter
might be liable at least to passengers for his negligence. The maritime cases
involving suits against port authorities for the negligence of a pilot offers some
analogy. Compare The Thielbek, 241 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 9th 1917), with Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 27 Fed. (2d) 370 (S.D. Ala. 1928).
5 Supra note 5.
54 Airspace within the immediate reaches above land is property of the land-
owner. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
65 Supra note 9.
56 See generally: 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2nd. ed. 1937)
§§2792-2822; 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th. ed. 1911)§§1644-1646, 1665-
1668.
57 Supra note 6.
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and that municipalities may not be held liable in tort for the negli-
gent operation thereof, except where they have been expressly ex-
empted from such liability by statute." 18
The court further indicated the proper proceedure to be followed in
avoiding liability - while "it might be wise to exempt municipalities
from tort liability in connecton with the construction, operation and
mantenance of airports... we think the exemption should be expressly
granted by the Legislature, rather than by judicial decree." 59 It is also
of interest to note in connection with the liability of municipalities
that landing fees are more and more becoming service fees, and there
is reason to believe that they will continue to be so.6"
Neither the United States nor any of its component states may be
sued without consent. In all state jurisdictions consent of a more or less
limited nature has been granted by statute, but here again, the rule
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and its study here would be
fruitless. 61 On the other hand consent of the United States to be sued
in tort is, in most instances, contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act
of 1946.62 The extent of that consent is now defined in Section 2674
of Title 28 of the United States Code:
"Liability of the United States: The United States shall be
liable respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims,
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages." 63
Exclusive jurisdiction for tort claims against the United States is cast
in the district courts:
"Section 1346, United States as defendant (b) . . . the district
courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, for injury or loss of
property, or for personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred." 4
With respect to liability of the United States for the tortious acts or
omissions of its ground control operators, perhaps the most important
section of the Act is §2680 of Title 28, Exceptions:
58 2 Avi. at 910.
" Ibid. at 911.
f'o See discussion: Dearing and Owen, National Transportation Policy
(Brookings 1949) pp. 25-29. Compare the realistic approach taken by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Abbott v. City of Des Moines, supra note 8. After
noting that revenue was equal to only 57 percent of the expense of operation,
the court remarked: "Obviously, the airport is not operated for profit to the city."
1941 U.S.Av.R.41.
61 See: Maguire, State Liability For Tort, 30 Harv. Law Rev. 20 (1916);
Borchard, Government Liability In Tort 34 Yale Law Jour. 1 (1934).
62 Public Law 601, 79th Cong., c. 753, 2nd Session, approved August 2, 1946,
28 U.S.C.A. §§921 et seq.
63 62 Stat. 980 (1948).
64 62 Stat. 933 (1948).
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The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused. 5
The activities of ground control operators are usually defined by regu-
lations and from their nature necessarily involve a considerable exer-
cise of discretion. Therefore, Section 2680 (a) will probably be in-
voked to bar actions in the kind of situation contemplated in Part III
supra.
The language of the Exception dealing with a "discretionary func-
tion or duty" is extremely broad. In Thomas v. United States,66 plain-
tiff sued under the Act for damages due to the loss of certain property.
The Corps of Engineers of the War Department had improperly lo-
cated dikes or revetments in the Missouri River which resulted in the
throwing of water upon the land in question. Defendant's motion to
dismiss was sustained under the Exception. The court, after noting
that authority for development of the river was conferred by Congress
upon the Secretary of War under the supervision of the Chief of Engi-
neers, went on to take the view "that the details or method of carrying
out the plan as submitted to and accepted by the Congress for the
development of navigable streams for navigation or for flood control
under the direction of the Chief of Engineers of the War Department
is a discretionary act within the meaning of Subsection (a) of Sec.
2680 .. .which would not render the Government liable for damage
resulting from abuse of that discretion or any error or mistake made
in carrying it out. '6 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
was not so uncharitable.68 The case was one for wrongful death by
endemic typhus as a result of the bite of a flea from an infected rat.
Defendant's negligence is failing to take adequate measures to exter-
minate rats on the premises of which deceased had been a tenant was
alleged as the cause. The answer to the discretionary function or duty
defense was "found in the language of Section 2680 itself because ...
the evidence shows that the government was not charged with a dis-
cretionary function or duty, but with the absolute duty of keeping the
premises safe for tenants."' 09 The absolute duty existed by state law.
It seems reasonably clear that the Exception will not work in favor
of the United. States where an order or regulation is clearly violated by
an employee of the government while acting within the scope of his
65 62 Stat. 948 (1948).
66 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D.Mo. 1949).
67 Ibid. at 882.
68 State of Maryland, for use of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate and Trust
Co. et al., 176 Fed. (2d) 414 (C.C.A. 4th 1949).
69 Ibid. at 419.
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employment. In Cerri et al., v. United States,70 recovery was allowed
for injuries sustained as a result of a shot fired by a soldier on duty
while attempting to halt the escape of a civilian under arrest for a
minor crime. In another case71 recovery was allowed the owner of a
turkey ranch for loss sustained as a result of low flying Air Force Per-
sonnel in violation of both civil and military regulations. The Excep-
tion was not mentioned in the opinion.72
Where there is no relevant order or regulation, or, if no violation is
proved, the problem is somewhat more difficult. In Denny et ux. v.
United States, 78 recovery was denied a commissioned officer and his
wife for loss sustained as a result of their child being born stillborn.
The negligence alleged was defendant's failure to promptly dispatch
an ambulance when labor started. The court found both a statute
and an Army regulation to the effect that medical officers shall attend
families of service personnel "whenever possible," and stated that "the
liability of the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act does
not extend to cases where, as here, injury results from the failure to
perform a mere discretionary function or duty, even though the dis-
cretion involved be abused. '74 Similarly, in an action 75 brought by
the wife of a veteran alleging negligence of the Veteran's Administra-
tion Facility at Tuskegee, Alabama, in releasing her husband well
knowing that his psychotic condition might be manifested in homi-
cidal tendencies. The court stated that "in effecting the discharge of,
said veteran, the instructions and directions contained in Veterans'
Administration regulations and procedures then in effect were followed
in complete and exact detail. ' 78 However, there is authority for hold-
ing the United States in such a case where a substantial showing of
negligence is made. In Jefferson v. United States, 77 plaintiff's claim
was based upon the negligence of an army officer in leaving a towel
in his stomach after an operation. The complaint was dismissed on
the grounds that there existed in the Act an implied exception on be-
half of the government for claims made by members of the Armed
Forces. While seeking to find such an exception the court stated, "the
problem here is made more difficult by reason of the fact ... that the
Act . . . contains numerous types of claims which are excepted from
the coverage of the Act, none of which, however, include the instant
solution, although in a prior proposed Act for the same general pur-
pose, there was included such an exception. ' 78
70 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D.Cal. 1948).
71 Hambright v. United States, - F. Supp. -; 2 Avi. 15,030 (W. D. So. Car.
1949).
,72 See also: San Diego Gas and Electric Company v. United States, i73 Fed.
(2d) 92; 2 Avi. 842 (C.C.A. 9th 1949).
73 171 Fed. (2d) 365 (C.C.A. 5th 1948).
74 Ibid. at 367.
7T Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
76 Ibid. at 431.
7777 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948).
78 Ibid. at 712.
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Such is at least a partial consideration of the Exception in the lower
federal courts. 79 While it is dangerous to generalize on such a paucity
of authority, the decisions seem to show, (a) that where there is a clear
violation of an order or regulation by an employee of the United States
acting within the scope of his authority, the Exception does not apply,
and (b) where the act or omission complained of is in the exercise of a
discretionary function or duty, or pursuant to a regulation or order, the
United States is not liable unless there is a substantial showing of
negligence.
V - CONCLUSIONS
The ground services offered aircraft operators by government -
federal, state and municipal - and by other agencies independent from
the immediate operation of flying the aircraft are legion. 'Such agencies
have been defined collectively as the ground control operator in very
general terms, and the many and varied services which each renders
have been lumped all together and treated as a single effort. This has
been done to outline general rules of law which it is hoped will serve as
guides in determining the question of liability in any particular factual
situation under consideration.
The most inclusive rule and it is submitted the most sound basis
upon which to start, is liability for reliance on the undertaking of an-
other. Its operation is not limited in application to GCA operators,
property owners or other special cases. The rule may readily apply to
the actions of weather dispatchers, traffic directors, and similarly en-
gaged ground personnel. It is a broad shoulder of tort liability and
can render full service, especially if it be remembered, in limitation,
that there is always to be determined in a given case, whether the
ground service negligently rendered was the legal cause of the harm for
which recovery is sought.
The principle of sovereign immunity in national law where there
is presented no problem of interference with the function of govern-
ment, is archaic. The loss occasioned by the negligence of an agent of
government should be borne by that government as it is borne by a
private individual, and should be treated as a cost of administration
to be distributed by taxes to the public. "In the course of a century or
more a steadily expanding coAception of public morality regarding
'governmental responsibility' has led to a 'generous policy of consent
for suits against government' to compensate for the negligence of its
agents as well as to secure obedience to its contracts." 80 There seems
to be no sound reason why that progress should stop.
79 In Larson, etc. v. United States, supra note 4, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
had occasion to comment in his dissent that, on the facts of an important prece-
dent to the principal case, recovery could not have been maintained today against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Section 2680 was cited.
337 U.S. at 718 n. 10.
80 Quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Larson Case, supra note 4,
337 U.S. at 709. Cf. the statement by the majority. Ibid. at 704.
